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Abstract: The paper analyzes the problem of asymmetric information between buyers and 
sellers in cattle auctions. An illustration is made regarding the vaccinations that the animals 
receive. Buyers do not know and cannot verify if sellers have vaccinated their animals forcing 
them to consider revaccination. Revaccination is only a part of the broader problem of 
information asymmetry that includes other quality issues and costs that can be saved, thereby 
increasing the welfare of both buyers and sellers. Structural characteristics of ranching, traditions 
and consumers’ preferences are taken into account and a wider approach is attempted to explain 
the persistence of the problem in light of potential institutional solutions. We argue for a 
comprehensive empirical study of the incidence and impacts of buyer revaccination. 
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Asymmetric Information in Cattle Auction:  The Problem of Revaccinations 
 
Introduction 
Market failure, or inefficient exchange, in the beef cattle industry can occur when cattle 
are sold in live or public cattle auctions.  In these auctions, sellers typically report the general 
protocol that was followed in their handling of their cattle, particularly with respect to 
vaccinations.  In many cases, sellers will simply report, “these cattle have had their shots.”  
However, buyers will often revaccinate the cattle they purchase to be sure the cattle are, in fact, 
vaccinated.  Although revaccination costs are typically small – between $0.50 and $5.00 per 
head – these costs can accumulate, especially when herds of hundreds or even thousands of cattle 
are revaccinated.  In addition to the direct costs associated with revaccination, there are also 
indirect costs.  For example, revaccination takes time, and revaccination can produce injection 
site lesions that lower the quality of a carcass.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the problem of asymmetric information in live 
cattle auctions.  Our analysis is motivated by the problem of revaccination – why do buyers 
revaccinate if sellers report that their cattle have had their shots?  This question embodies issues 
arising from institutional characteristics of the cattle auction system in which cattle are priced on 
weight and knowledge of upstream production practices is not costlessly transparent to 
downstream users.  Although asymmetric information has been studied in other livestock 
systems (e.g., Allen, 1993), to date there has been no systematic study examining asymmetric 
information and its implications in the context of the live cattle auction system.  This paper is a 
first step in that direction.  We begin the paper by discussing the nature of asymmetric 
information generally.  We also provide a brief overview of the beef cattle food chain and a 
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discussion of the development of the live cattle auction system.  We then show how asymmetric 
information could be an important problem in the live cattle auction system, as illustrated by the 
propensity of buyers to revaccinate the cattle they purchase when told the cattle have already 
been vaccinated.  Given the significance of the beef cattle industry to U.S. agriculture as a whole, 
we argue for a more comprehensive empirical investigation of the asymmetric problem.  Simply, 
are there potential cost reductions that could be obtained from a recognition, understanding, and 
resolution of the asymmetric information problem in live cattle auctions?  We also argue that, 
although solutions to the asymmetric information problem have been proposed or are in the 
process of being implemented, structural characteristics of U.S. ranching may impede the 
application of these institutional measures on a large scale.   
 
Information, Asymmetric Information and Market Failure 
 The classical economic model underestimates the importance of information in the 
economy. To be more accurate, it simply ignores information.  This is due to one of the main 
assumptions of the classical model: Actors interact in a frictionless economic system where 
information is available to everybody instantly and at no cost.  Although information costs were 
widely apparent in economic activities, it was years before economists began to incorporate them 
within their models.  This was due in part to the convenience that the classical assumptions 
provided.  This changed following Stigler’s 1961 paper on the “Economics of Information” and 
the corresponding development of the research field of New Institutional Economics (NIE). 
 Within the NIE framework, information is central, impacting issues of risk, uncertainty, 
opportunism, adverse selection and moral hazard, as well as institutions generally.  According to 
North (1990), the role of institutions is “to reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to 
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everyday life.”  In order to interact with others we must know the rules of the game, otherwise 
uncertainty will be high and value-creating transactions may not occur.  In order to acquire the 
needed information, human economic actors form institutions that come at a cost.  Information is 
costly because actors have to spend time acquiring it and measuring the attributes of the goods 
(quality).  Harold Demsetz (1993) refers to information-knowledge as a fundamental feature of 
firms, and he characterizes the firm as a repository of knowledge.  Oliver Williamson (1985) 
analyzed the implications of incomplete information among economic actors.  Opportunism 
coupled with information that only one party has (i.e. asymmetric information between parties) 
may result in adverse selection and moral hazard.   
George Akerlof (1970) was an early pioneer by examining the consequences of 
asymmetric information.  He used the example of a used car market in which sellers know the 
quality of the cars they sell but buyers do not.  This drives the prices of good cars down.  The 
reason is that buyers know that sellers of both good and bad cars have an incentive to claim that 
their cars are good in order to sell them at higher prices.  If it is costly or difficult for buyers to 
find the true quality of cars, they are, at best, willing to pay an “average” price, thus driving good 
cars (or cars valued higher than the average) out of the market or resulting in an inefficient 
allocation of good (and bad) cars.  We claim that this describes live cattle auctions in this sense:  
Determining whether cattle auctioned at live cattle auctions have been vaccinated is difficult for 
buyers.  Thus, buyers are either not informed of the quality of cattle – in which vaccinated cattle 
are assumed to be of higher quality than unvaccinated cattle – or they do not trust the statements 
of sellers indicating that cattle are vaccinated.  Thus, buyers vaccinate cattle, some of which have 
already been vaccinated and, perhaps, drive the average price paid for all cattle lower as in the 
case of the used cars.  
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 The determination of quality in the face of asymmetric information is directly related to 
the issue of measurement costs.  If a low cost method of determining whether cattle have been 
vaccinated can exist, then the live cattle auction system could segment the market into 
vaccinated cattle and unvaccinated cattle, thus resolving the problem of asymmetric information.  
Allen (1993) shows this in an analysis of veal calf auctions in British Columbia.  While breed 
does not play any significant role in the sales of feeder cattle where usually Angus and Hereford 
dominate as pure beef breeds, it is not the case in veal calf where Holstein (although a dairy 
breed) dominate in live auction sales.  The reason, according to Allen, lies in a unique 
characteristic of Holstein, which is used as an easy and low cost signal for quality measurement.  
Holstein calves develop a “pot belly” when fed hay (low quality veal) instead of milk and grain 
(high quality veal).  The pot belly is a low cost signal of quality.  The ability of buyers to identify 
at low cost good from poor quality veal allows the market to segment and differentially price 
veal, resulting in a (relatively more) efficient allocation of veal. 
 
The beef food chain and the development of the live cattle auction system  
Prior to the development of railroad and telegraph, livestock as well as other agricultural 
commodity markets were inefficient and unorganized (see Olson, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d).  
This was because of the existence of extremely high transaction (transportation) costs.  The 
traditional mercantile firm was responsible for marketing and distribution of goods.  Once the 
telegraph and the railroad made their appearance transaction costs were considerably reduced.  
Large-scale markets could emerge, as well as a type of intermediary (drovers) who “arranged the 
purchase, transport and delivery of products across the nation and brought an organizational 
revolution to agriculture” (Olson, 2001a, p. 3).  The problem with the drovers was the price 
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markup they received because ranchers were depending on them to sell their livestock.  The 
ongoing development of railways, however, gave ranchers access to markets directly, thus 
reducing their dependency, and ultimately eliminating the need for drovers.  Major terminals 
were created in Kansas City and Chicago, where many buyers and sellers met to trade, thereby 
creating a competitive market. “The railroads created a national market for beef, pork and mutton 
when they opened the Great Plains and the Southwest to trade” (Olson, 2001a, p. 3).  One other 
problem appeared.  “As the size and scale of terminal stockyards increased it was difficult for 
individual ranchers to market their own animals effectively due to lack of market savvy and 
familiarity with stockyards personnel. This reduced the likelihood of a suitable financial return” 
(Olson, 2001b, p. 7).  The commission merchant emerged as a necessary intermediary.  Their 
cost of operation was relatively small, and so they quickly replaced the institution of drovers.   
Price discovery at these terminal markets is more efficient than in direct sales.  This is 
because sales at terminal markets are made under nearly standard conditions and are based on a 
measurable attribute – for instance, the weight of cattle.  The ability of buyers and sellers to 
discover prices at markets allows them to calculate readily net returns from price quotations.  
Many livestock buyers and sellers consider terminal market prices the only accurate barometer of 
cattle prices (Greene, 1969).   
Improvements in transportation technologies, which produce savings in shrinkage and 
marketing costs, resulted in a gradual replacement of terminal markets by regional live cattle 
auction markets.  “The invention of the motor truck brought a second organizational revolution 
to the livestock trade” (Olson, 2001d, p. 20). The dense web of roads created an opportunity for 
many ranchers who resided far from railroads to sell their cattle quickly and easily.  It also 
allowed ranchers near railroads to sell in nearby places rather than going to distant terminals.  
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The regional cattle auction institution emerged in the Great Plains by 1940s and 1950s.  Terminal 
markets declined until they had nearly disappeared by early 1970s.  
The direct marketing of cattle is an alternative to regional live cattle auctions, and its use 
has increased due to continued improvements in transportation facilities.  In direct marketing, 
each sale is a private agreement between individual buyers and sellers.  Therefore, sales are more 
geographically scattered than sales from live cattle auctions.  Additionally, the amount of shrink 
charged, weighing conditions, terms of delivery, and terms of payment tend to vary from ranch 
to ranch.  There is scope for inefficient price discovery through direct marketing, however, as 
less than purely competitive conditions of price formation are prevalent.  According to St. Clair 
(1976, p. 1), the “direct method of marketing is high in technical efficiency (i.e. savings in 
shrinkage and marketing costs) but it may be low in pricing efficiency.” 
 
Cattle auctions and information 
The beef food chain can be represented as a pyramid.  At the base of the pyramid lie the 
cow-calf producers, who maintain an average herd size of approximately 40 cows.1  They sell to 
auctions once or twice a year and usually keep the calves for about eight months to a year.  In the 
second stage are the backgrounders, who maintain herds with average size of about 1000 head.  
There are fewer backgrounders than cow-calf producers, but still enough to produce competitive 
conditions in auctions in most cases.  Backgrounders patronize cattle auctions five to six times a 
year and keep the calves for around three to nine months.  The third level players are the 
feedlots.  Approximately 98 percent of US feedlots have capacities of less than 1,000 head of 
cattle, although the few maintaining herds with an average size in excess of 30,000 head market 
40 percent of fed cattle (USDA, 2003).  Feedlots usually buy cattle through direct sales from 
 6
backgrounders, although they may also purchase through auctions from either backgrounders or 
cow-calf producers.  Feedlots keep cattle for approximately four to five months.  The apex of the 
pyramid is occupied by only a few meat processors, who often have a flow of 1000 or more head 
per day.2  The vast majority of their cattle come through direct sales from feedlots, but small 
numbers come from large ranchers or groups of ranchers (cooperatives) by way of auctions. 
Live cattle auction sales are ubiquitous at the cow-calf producer to backgrounder stage of 
the beef food chain.  They are less common, or even rarely used, at higher levels of the beef food 
chain (i.e. between backgrounders and feedlots and between feedlots and processors), in which 
direct marketing of cattle is the norm.  Live cattle auctions have many characteristics of a 
competitive market in the classical model.  A small seller (i.e., having 25-40 head) who wants to 
sell a few calves can notify an auction house asking them to pick his calves for auctioning.  Such 
auctions lower the cost of price discovery for these ranchers, which Coase (1937) argued is the 
principal source of transaction costs in a market.  For example, Crase and Dollery (1999) used 
the Travel Cost Method to evaluate the importance of the market information provided to sellers. 
They wanted “to quantify the value of market information gained by sale yard users through 
direct visits to livestock selling complexes.”  They estimate the cost at $160.50, which 
“represents the annual value of market information derived by a single producer directly visiting 
the sale yard venue” (p. 205).  The value of price discovery is a principal advantage to ranchers 
who have relatively small herds and who frequent markets only a few times a year.  However, as 
we show below, a problem with cattle auctions is the asymmetric information problem.  The 
asymmetric information problem also will have a bearing on the negotiation aspects between the 
players in the market.  Another disadvantage with auctions is that there is much scope for the 
spread of diseases due to the co-mingling of various cattle from different areas and the resulting 
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animal stress, which demands that auction operators take costly measures to minimize the risk of 
disease spread.  
Direct cattle sales overcome the problem of asymmetric information, because buyers are 
more likely to buy from sellers they know (or who have an established reputation, particularly 
with respect to statements regarding protocol, such as vaccination histories).  However, price 
discovery is costly in direct sales, thus making them attractive only to large buyers and sellers 
who have more frequent interactions with markets than small-scale ranchers. 
 
Asymmetric information in cattle auctions 
We argue that asymmetric information might be an important problem in live cattle 
auctions, as manifested in part by the revaccination problem in which buyers of cattle that are 
reported to have had their vaccinations repeat the vaccinations after purchase.  Why do buyers 
revaccinate, if auction runners (or sellers) announce that the herd has been vaccinated?  There are 
two possible answers.  The first is that buyers do not trust the statements of sellers.  The reason is 
reflected in the fact that buyers cannot distinguish at low cost cattle that have been vaccinated 
from cattle that have not been vaccinated.  This results in a pooled price for cattle in which cattle 
that have been vaccinated and cattle that have not been vaccinated are sold at the same price, 
usually with price determined by cattle weight and, perhaps, by other measurable attributes.  
Such pricing could provide less incentives for sellers to vaccinate their cattle resulting in an even 
greater number of cattle offered for sale that are not vaccinated, thus giving buyers greater 
reasons to vaccinate cattle they purchase.  This problem is exacerbated when sellers might not 
place a high priority on reputation building or if the sale is blind with respect to the parties 
involved as is the case using order buyers.  Furthermore, vaccination in cattle purchased might 
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not be a high priority for buyers, who focus primarily on price, weight, breed, external 
appearance (signals for good condition).  The second answer is that buyers might trust the 
reported protocol but revaccinate for other reasons.  For example, many buyers buy cattle from 
many sellers and thus co-mingle cattle from different herds.  Different regions throughout North 
America might have slightly different protocols for vaccination, because some diseases are more 
common in some parts of the country than others, and vaccinations occur on different schedules.  
Therefore, buyers might revaccinate in order to have a homogeneous treatment of their animals.  
Furthermore, some buyers might prefer a particular brand or type of vaccine.  In the absence of 
definitive empirical evidence, we are unable to distinguish between vaccinations by buyers 
occurring for either of these two reasons.  However, as we show below, both reasons represent 
an inefficiency that has its roots in the asymmetric information problem and which are 
perpetuated by structural conditions inherent within the U.S. beef industry. 
Historically, problems derived from the information asymmetry were recognized and 
attempts have been made to solve them.  For instance, in the 1950s sellers used to “accompany 
their livestock to market and remain until they are sold” and “prospective buyers were often able 
to discuss the merits and faults of a specific animal with the owner” (Johnson, 1954, p. 1).  
Johnson continues: “Generally, buyers will pay higher prices for animals consigned by reputable 
producers who assure them privately that the animals are clean and O.K.”  However, over time 
there has been a change in the livelihood of sellers.  Traditionally, most farmers were full-time 
farmers who accompanied their herds to the auctions and were willing to establish a relationship 
with buyers.  Today, many cow-calf producers are part-time ranchers; thus, the opportunity costs 
of their time are much greater than traditional farmers, resulting in their spending less time at the 
auctions.  
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The problem of asymmetric information may also be associated with the consumer 
demand in the market.  If consumers do not care about differences in quality or about health and 
safety aspects of the foods they consume, then asymmetric information would not be an issue in 
that no signal would be transmitted downwards in the beef chain for price differentiation.  
However, quality is important for consumers, who are often willing to pay more for better 
quality (Melton, Huffman, Shogren, and Fox, 1996; Jensem, 1986; see also Smith, 1986).  
Moreover, in the last 10-15 years there was a dramatic increase in consumers’ concern about 
food safety issues because of series of problems like presence of dioxins in chicken and mad cow 
disease (i.e., BSE) in Europe, as well as issues related to genetically modified organisms.  
Consumers have also become sensitive to environmental issues, the well-being of animals and 
labor issues.  Therefore, shifting consumer sentiments might suggest a greater need to understand 
the nature and extent of asymmetric problems in cattle markets, resulting, perhaps, in 
opportunities for the cattle industry to lower costs or increase value added.  
 
Market inefficiency illustration  
 We illustrate the inefficiency of revaccinations resulting from asymmetric information 
using a simplified game theory framework.  We assume that there are sellers and buyers of cattle.  
A particular seller will either vaccinate (v) or not vaccinate (n).  Similarly, a particular buyer will 
either vaccinate or not vaccinate depending on his belief of whether the seller has vaccinated or 
not.  We use the following variables (with definitions provided): 
• e Expected value of a healthy animal   
• c Cost of vaccinating an animal  
• s Cost of treating a sick animal  
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•  Probability that an animal gets sick if vaccinated  vsp
•  Probability that an animal gets sick if not vaccinated  nsp
•  Probability that an animal dies if vaccinated  vdp
•  Probability that an animal dies if not vaccinated  ndp
We assume that  and ; the probability that an animal gets sick or dies 
when not vaccinated exceeds the probability the animal gets sick or dies if vaccinated.  For 
simplicity, we also assume that the loss of an animal that dies is e (there is no salvage value to 
the animal carcass).  We first examine the incentives for sellers to vaccinate and then examine 
the incentives for buyers to vaccinate.   
v
s
n
s pp > vdnd pp >
 
Vaccination by Sellers 
Given the assumptions of the model, vaccination by sellers is efficient if the cost of 
vaccinating cattle is not greater than the cost of not vaccinating cattle.  This is true if  
  (1) epspepspc nd
n
s
v
d
v
s +≤++
or if  
 . (2) svd
n
d
v
s
n
s cppeppsc ≡−+−≤ )()(
The left hand side of equation (1) is the expected cost to the seller from vaccination, 
while the right hand side of (1) is the expected cost to the seller from not vaccinating the animal.  
Equation (2) says that sellers will find it in their interest to vaccinate if the cost of vaccination is 
not too high – that is, if the per unit cost of vaccination does not exceed a maximum per unit 
value, c .  An increase in c  means that it is more efficient for sellers to vaccinate, other things 
being equal.  The maximum per unit cost, c , increases in s, e,  and ; it decreases in  
s s
s n
sp
n
dp
v
sp
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and .  That is, it is efficient for sellers to vaccinate if the cost of treating a sick animal 
increases, the overall value of the animal increases, and the probabilities of an unvaccinated 
animal getting sick or dying increase.  Sellers have a diminished incentive to vaccinate if the 
probability that a vaccinated animal gets sick or dies increases, other things being equal. 
v
dp
sc
Whether a particular seller vaccinates his cattle before offering them for sale at a live 
cattle auction, however, depends in part on that seller’s per unit cost of vaccination.  Because 
different farmers have idiosyncratic characteristics, for some farmers c  while for others 
, depending on the exact values that each farmer attributes to the above variables.  In other 
words, for some sellers vaccination is efficient, while others it is not.
sc≤
c >
3   
Do all sellers with  vaccinate their cattle?  Unfortunately, there is no hard evidence 
on the rates of and reasons for vaccination by sellers, which is one reason we call for an 
extensive examination of vaccination practices.  Nevertheless, we conjecture that larger ranchers 
will have an incentive to vaccinate, while cow-calf producers with smaller operations – which 
are the vast majority – will not.  The reason is that, other things being equal, larger ranches will 
likely have lower per unit costs of vaccination than smaller ranches, because the size of operation 
allows fixed costs associated with developing a vaccination program to be amortized over a 
larger output.  Moreover, smaller herds may have less risk of getting diseases, thus reducing the 
seller’s perceived need (and hence incentive) for vaccination.  For instance, for ranchers with 
small herds, the probability that an unvaccinated animal gets sick or dies might be lower than the 
corresponding probabilities for large cow-calf operations, resulting in a reduction in  for 
small-scale ranchers.  This will make it less likely that a small-scale cow-calf producer will find 
it in his interest to vaccinate, other things being equal. 
scc ≤
sc
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Vaccination by Buyers 
Buyers have to choose whether to vaccinate the cattle they purchase.  If cattle have been 
vaccinated, buyers would not need to revaccinate.  However, buyers cannot know with certainty 
whether cattle they purchase have been vaccinated, even if sellers announce that their cattle have 
been vaccinated.  Therefore, buyers must decide whether to believe announcements by sellers.  
Because buyers do not have full information about whether cattle have been vaccinated, let q, 
where 0 , be the (perceived) probability that the seller vaccinated his cattle.  Buyers will 
not vaccinate if the cost of not vaccinating is less than the cost of vaccinating.  This is true if 
1≤≤ q
  (3) epspcepspqepspq vd
v
s
n
d
n
s
v
d
v
s ++≤+−++ ))(1()(
or if  
 . (4) bvd
n
d
v
s
n
s cqppeppsc ≡−−+−≥ )1)](()([
The left hand side of equation (3) represents the expected cost to the buyer from not 
vaccinating.  If consists of two parts, distinguished by the probability that the cattle purchased 
have been vaccinated (q) and the probability that the cattle purchased have not been vaccinated 
(1 ).  The right hand side of equation (3) is the expected cost to the buyer of vaccination.  
Equation (4) says that it is not efficient for buyers to vaccinate cattle they purchase if the cost of 
vaccination is too high – that is, if the per unit cost of vaccination exceeds a maximum condition, 
.  This condition is similar to c  (the condition for sellers), although for buyers it is also a 
function of, q, the probability that sellers have vaccinated.   
q−
bc s
There are two important points to be made here.  First, as long as buyers (a) expect that 
some sellers have not vaccinated their cattle and (b) cannot identify at low cost who those sellers 
are, then  and thus, at least for some buyers, the c  condition will hold, resulting in 
buyers believing it is efficient to vaccinate (or revaccinate, if sellers have already vaccinated 
1<q bc<
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their cattle).4  This suggests that buyer beliefs are important.  In fact, the greater the (perceived) 
probability that cattle have been vaccinated, the less likely buyers will vaccinate, other things 
being equal (i.e., c  decreases in q, resulting a greater likelihood that the cost of vaccination will 
exceed the maximum amount, making it inefficient to vaccinate).  In the limit  as  
(i.e., vaccination is never efficient if all sellers always vaccinate or buyers can know at zero cost 
which sellers have and have not vaccinated).  Therefore, institutional or other factors that 
improve the quality and quantity of information transmitted from sellers to buyers could reduce 
the incidence of inefficient revaccination. 
b
sc<
0=bc 1⇒q
sc
Second, if buyers believe with positive probability that sellers have vaccinated, (i.e., 
), then .  This suggests that, other things being equal, the per unit cost of 
vaccination for buyers, which includes not only the cost of the vaccine but also the opportunity 
cost of time and the reduced value of meat resulting from injection site lesions, must be lower 
than the per unit cost of vaccination by sellers before buyers will vaccinate, other things being 
equal.  Thus, for some buyers c , suggesting that it is not efficient for them to vaccinate, 
even though the vaccination condition would be met from a seller’s perspective (i.e., c  and 
 could hold simultaneously).
0>q
bcc ≥
bc
bc≥
≤
5  But, some buyers might revaccinate anyway, for example, 
because they are concerned about commingling of cattle from different herds, or because they 
prefer certain vaccination regimens to others.  Even in these cases, buyer revaccination is 
inefficient as long as  (because  already incorporates the probabilities of cattle getting 
sick or dying, from, for instance, the co-mingled of herds).  Simply, if  then it is not 
efficient for a buyer to vaccinate.   
bcc ≥ bc
bcc ≥
Importantly, there is no hard evidence on the incidence of vaccination (or revaccination) 
of cattle by buyers (or sellers).  Given the significance of the U.S. beef cattle industry to 
 14
agriculture and the economy, particularly vis-à-vis increasing foreign competition, efforts to 
lower costs (by avoiding the problem of buyer revaccination, for instance) are paramount.  
Accordingly, we argue for a comprehensive empirical examination of the incidence and causes 
of buyer (and seller) vaccination of cattle as a means of understanding the nature and extent of 
the asymmetric information problem and of providing, if possible, mechanisms by which 
production costs could be lowered.  
 
Solutions to the problem of asymmetric information 
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society; more formally, they are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction (North, 1990).  In the case of revaccination by 
buyers, institutional solutions to the asymmetric information problem would increase the 
quantity and quality of information about the cattle that buyers purchase, such as knowledge of 
parental lines, progeny, types of medications given, and feeding and handling regimes, thus 
allowing buyers to make more efficient vaccination decisions (i.e., vaccinate when efficient to do 
so, or when , and not vaccinate when not efficient to do so, or when ).  We consider 
briefly three institutional solutions to the asymmetric information problem: (a) source 
verification and traceability programs, (b) certified preconditioning programs, and (c) video and 
electronic auctions.  Our purpose is not to provide a comprehensive examination of these 
programs.  Rather, it is to assess their potential in solving the problem of asymmetric information 
in live cattle auctions in order to reduce the likelihood that buyers will engage in inefficient 
revaccination of cattle.  We suggest that while these programs can be effective in alleviating 
some aspects of the asymmetric information problem, in practice they will be ineffective, given 
the structural characteristics of the U.S. cattle industry. 
bcc < bcc ≥
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 Source verification and traceability programs 
“Source verification” refers to a program in which a third party assures the condition of 
the cattle to buyers, such as how the cattle was treated, their health status, feeding, vaccinations, 
weaning, castration, dehorning processes, etc.  Source verification programs are often private 
initiatives of groups of farmers who “recognized that significant niche markets exist for 
consistent-quality beef and pork products and that other niche markets which address emerging 
consumer needs can be successful (e.g. Niman Ranch Pork)” (Bailey and Hayes, 2002, p. 2).  
Examples include the MFA Health Track Beef Alliance (information available online at 
http://www.mfaincorporated.com/livestock/beef/healthtrack/index.asp) and the University of 
Missouri Commercial Agriculture program’s Premier Beef Program.  In the case of Premier 
Beef, average value added for the years of operation (1998-2002) was $44.41 per head 
(information available online at http://agebb.missouri.edu/commag/beef/premierbeef/).  
Source verification allows producers to capture higher premiums on quality.  The reason 
is that information flow is guaranteed from the processor to the farm.  Source verification also 
offers the possibility of traceability.  “Traceability is obtained through a system of records and 
certifications that allow a product to be traced back to its origins.  Currently, most red meat is 
traceable back to the processor but not to the farm level” (Bailey and Hayes, 2002, p. 1).  
Vertical coordination is a key part of facilitating information flow and thereby gaining 
premiums. Instead of cow-calf producers selling their cattle to backgrounders, groups of 
producers build alliances by integrating backgrounding and by retaining ownership of cattle, 
thereby gaining value added from the backgrounding activity when they market directly to 
feedlots.   
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There are considerable transaction costs associated with establishing a traceability 
program.  First, there has historically not been a demand for traceability within the U.S meat 
market, in part because the industry does not depend heavily on exports – although over time this 
is changing.  Standardization and price discrimination will effectively capture gains from niche 
markets for different grades of quality.  Porter’s approach for technical firms applies also in the 
case of cattle.  Absence of product standardization impedes cost improvements (e.g. 
revaccination).  Given the increased degree of uncertainty of consumers especially after the 
single BSE case in the U.S., lack of standards can lead to consumer’s suspicion (Porter, 1980).  
Additionally, in order to be able to trace back every animal (not only cattle) within a 
short period of time, as provisioned by the U.S. Animal Identification Plan (information 
available online at http://usaip.info), it is necessary that full coordination exists between all links 
of the beef chain, including cow-calf producer, backgrounder, feedlot, packer, wholesale, and 
retailer (Rentfrow, 2003).  Importantly, traceability does not necessarily guarantee quality – 
vaccinated cattle might still get sick or die from illness or disease.  If an animal gets sick or dies, 
is it because the animal was – or in spite of being – vaccinated?  Although traceability might 
allow a cattle owner to trace the origin of his herd back to original owners, it cannot necessarily 
be used to “prove” to original owners that they had not vaccinated cattle if they had reported that 
they had.  Only when traceability is combined with third party verification of traceability reports 
will buyers begin to believe seller reports that cattle have been vaccinated or with the building 
of brand equity that can occur in this type of coordinated system.  But even here, the impact of 
traceability combined with third part verification will be that buyers will have more accurate 
perceptions of the probability that cattle purchased have been vaccinated, thus resulting in a 
reduced incentive for vaccinations (per the model presented above).  However, third party 
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verification is costly to implement, except in cases in which herd sizes are large (which allows 
for the amortization of verification costs over a greater level of production).  Thus, the 
asymmetric information problem, manifested by revaccination of cattle by buyers, is not 
necessarily resolved here. 
 
Certified preconditioning programs 
Certified preconditioning programs, as the term indicates, involve formal certification 
and documentation about the preconditioning activities that have been implemented by sellers.  
The term preconditioning per se is quite loose and “there is no standardized definition for this 
term as it applies to beef calves prior to, during, and/or after the weaning and shipping period” 
(Lalman and Smith 2001, p.1).  An example of a preconditioning program is Oklahoma Quality 
Beef Network (information available online at http://www.ansi.okstate.edu/exten/cc-
corner/oqbnsummary.html).  Premiums are calculated to vary between $3 and $8 cwt, which 
translates to $15-$40 per head (Avent, et al. 2003). 
“Preconditioning programs involve a series of management practices on the ranch to 
improve health and nutrition of calves. Preconditioning adds value to calves benefiting the cow-
calf producers. Preconditioning is not a new idea, but has received considerable attention in 
recent years in value-added programs for cow-calf producers, beef quality assurance programs, 
and strategic alliances in beef industry” (Avent, et al., 2003, p. 1).  The premiums derived from 
preconditioning programs come principally from the weaning procedure.  Weaned cattle suffer 
much less stress when transferred and co-mingled.  This stress is a main source of disease and 
death among cattle (Lalman and Smith, 2001).  For instance, Avent et al. (2003) provide 
evidence that the probability of sickness is reduced in preconditioning programs.  Furthermore, 
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according to Texas Cattle Feeders Association Feedlot Managers, precondition calves produce a 
higher percentage of Choice carcasses compared to non-preconditioned cattle (Avent, et al. 
2003).  Lalman and Smith (2001, p. 5) estimate that weaning in the ranch “can capture $50 – $75 
per head of additional value compared to a production system where weaning, vaccination, and 
other management practices associated with preconditioning occur after shipment from the ranch 
of origin.” 
Preconditioning programs can alleviate the asymmetric information problem at live cattle 
auctions only when buyers trust the certification programs and procedures.  If buyers do not fully 
trust the programs or the third parties responsible for certification, then they will not be willing 
to offer premiums for certified quality cattle, thus mitigating perceived benefits that sellers 
require in order to justify the added costs associated with preconditioning.  Simply, if buyers 
base their vaccination decisions on the probability that sellers have vaccinated, then a lack of 
trust in the system will not increase the buyer’s perception that sellers have vaccinated, thus 
resulting in many buyers believing it is efficient to vaccinate when, in fact, sellers have already 
done so.  Furthermore, because preconditioning “works” when buyers trust the certification 
procedures and programs, problems of asymmetric information are not necessarily eliminated, 
but rather are transferred from sellers to entities maintaining the certification processes (i.e., will 
buyers trust the certifiers?).  
 
Video and electronic auctions 
Video and electronic auctions are a natural outgrowth of improvements in information 
technology.  These auctions can reduce time as well as other transaction costs.  In a video 
auction, buyers observe cattle via monitors and bid for them from their homes or offices without 
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spending time to go to the auction place.  Electronic auctions are typically online and consist of a 
description of a specified cattle lot (often with photographs), and an ability of potential buyers to 
enter bids.  An important difference between video and electronic auctions is that video auctions 
are synchronous in that all buyers bid simultaneously, online or electronic auctions have a time 
margin.  A second important difference relative to our discussion of information asymmetry is 
the amount of information offered.  Video auctions have the potential of providing more 
important information about sellers and their cattle to buyers than online auctions because of the 
presence of a third party who visits the ranches and videotapes the cattle, thus verifying the 
condition of cattle at the source of production.  This aspect is very important in solving at least a 
part of the problem of asymmetric information regarding vaccinations given to the cattle.  In the 
case of online auctions, sellers will often report production protocols, such as cattle having had 
their vaccinations, but no “evidence” is offered to support the claims, thus resulting in 
asymmetric information problems.  Bailey, Peterson, and Brorsen (1991, p. 465-66) studied and 
compared video auctions to regional auctions. They found that  
Satellite video auctions reduce travel time and expenses for buyers who can bid from 
remote locations. They also reduce buyers’ search time since they can offer a large 
number of cattle quickly.…  Using video auctions health problems are reduced because 
cattle is not mingled with those from other lots, and is transported to only one 
destination.… Video auctions may provide buyers with more information about the 
history of cattle, type of feed, and vaccinations than traditional auctions provide.… This 
information could reduce buyers’ death losses, reduce veterinary costs, and increase 
feedlot efficiency.  
 
As a result, video auction prices are often higher than regional market prices.  Buyers 
“are willing to pay between $4.62 per head and $23.52 per head more for a 700-pound steer 
purchased through video auction than for a steer purchased at a traditional auction” (Bailey, 
Peterson, and Brorsen, 1991, p. 472).  However, video auctions favor large producers.  This is 
very important for our analysis.  As Bailey and Peterson (1991, p. 402) conclude, “video 
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auctions accommodate large transactions well, unlike traditional auctions that seem to be 
designed to facilitate relatively small transactions.”  Thus, because video auctions favor large 
producers, and because the U.S. beef cow industry at least at the cow-calf stage is dominated by 
small producers, it is unlikely that video auctions will soon become the norm.  Making it the 
norm will be costly, given that sellers must “contract” with third parties to visit their farms and 
video tape their cattle.  We do not expect that small-scale ranchers will necessarily find it in their 
interest to incur such expenses.  Consequently, problems of asymmetric information will remain.   
 
General drawbacks of the solutions 
We argue that the structural features of ranching and the beef cattle industry in the U.S. 
make implementation of these approaches as solutions to the asymmetric information problem 
difficult.  First, economic facets of beef production suggest that there will be significant 
transaction costs associated with implementing an alternative to commodity weight marketing of 
beef cattle, whereas in non-beef systems alternatives to commodity weight marketing have 
developed at relatively low cost.  For example, the modern housing arrangements for pork and 
poultry allow (and even favor) identical genotypes and phenotypes in all areas of the country.  
The indoor environment of a pork facility in North Carolina may be constructed the same as a 
facility in Oregon.  The type of swine, (including growth rate, feed efficiency, and so forth) 
needed in both facilities, can thus be identical favoring full integration and replication of 
production facilities and systems with little regard to location.  One of the advantages of this 
system is that animals are transferred between stages of the system based on a variety of product 
characteristics and not just the animals’ weight, as is currently the case in the commodity beef 
system.  In contrast, the cattle industry has production facets that do not favor a transition to the 
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level of vertical integration seen in these other industries and thus will likely not follow suit.  The 
environment, forage type, and pest exposure in different areas of the North American continent 
dictate that cattle breeds and genetics are chosen that will enable the animal to excel biologically 
and economically in each of these areas and will differ depending on location.  A particular 
breed and type of cow that is best suited for the Midwest is much different from that required in 
the Southwest, for example.  Whereas poultry and pork production environments are tailored to 
the production systems, beef production systems are tailored to the local environments.   
Second, beef cattle herds at the cow-calf stage of production are small, and are likely to 
remain small, particularly given the economic facets of cattle production mentioned above.  
Indeed, beef cow herds have an average size of 40 head, although many exceed 100 head of 
cattle (USDA, 2003).  Given the cost of video auctions, only large-scale farmers will likely be 
willing to incur the associated costs.  Traceability is also costly to implement, and, as mentioned 
above, does not necessarily resolve the incentive buyers might have to vaccinate cattle that have 
been reported to have been vaccinated unless there is third party verification, which also favors 
large producers.  Only when identity preservation programs become mandatory and an effective 
system of compliance enforcement is established with the problem of asymmetric information in 
live cattle auctions be resolved.  The implication is that proposed solutions to the asymmetric 
problem are unlikely to resolve the basic manifested problem – that of buyer revaccination of 
cattle they purchase.  
 
Conclusions 
 Information asymmetry creates inefficient outcomes. Buyers do not minimize their costs 
and sellers do not maximize their rents. We examine the asymmetric information problem as it 
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pertains to inefficient revaccination of beef cattle purchased through the live auction system.  
However, we expect that the problem of revaccination is only a manifestation of a larger problem 
of asymmetric information in the live cattle auction system.  Furthermore, we do not expect that 
solutions to the asymmetric information problem are feasible in the near term, given structural 
characteristics of ranching and the beef cattle industry.  
 We propose that more research is needed in the nature and extent of asymmetric 
information in the beef cattle industry.  For example, research is needed in order to determine the 
exact incidence of buyer revaccination and the structural and economic impact of this incidence.  
Furthermore, we expect that many buyers revaccinate their cattle because of a lack of trust in 
statements made by sellers or auction handlers, although many buyers might revaccinate their 
cattle for other reasons.  Understanding buyer perceptions and the reasons they make the 
production decisions that they do will provide important insights into the asymmetric 
information problem, particularly if buyers (and even sellers) perceive there is a “problem” with 
the live cattle auction system. Potential solutions will likely be accelerated with the 
quantification of the problem and the understanding of the value that is being left on the table in 
status quo. 
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Notes 
 
5$=c 400$= 20$= %7=nsp %5=vsp %3=ndp %1=vdp
scc =≤= 4.85
5$= 400$=
20$=s %6=nsp %5=vsp %2=ndp %1=vdp scc =>= 2.45
5$
1 According to the USDA (2003), “The average beef cow herd is 40 head, but operations with 100 or more beef 
cows comprise 9 percent of all beef operations and 51 percent of the beef cow inventory. Operations with 40 or 
fewer head are largely part of multi-enterprises, or are supplemental to off-farm employment.”  
2 Hendrickson and Heffernan (2002) report the concentration ratio of the top four beef packers is 81 percent. 
3  For example, suppose a seller has the following values for the variables (with hypothetical values based loosely on 
information derived from University of Missouri, 2003; Avent, Ward, and Lalman, 2003; Lalman and Smith, 2001): 
, e , s , , , , and , resulting in the condition 
, which holds.  Therefore, as long as the cost of vaccination is not too large, it is efficient for 
cattle owners to vaccinate their cattle.  However, suppose another seller’s parameters are: c , e , 
, , , , and , resulting in the condition , 
suggesting it is not in the seller’s interest to vaccinate. 
4  Suppose a buyer has parameter values as follows:  =c 700$, =e 20$, =s %7=nsp %5=vsp
%3=ndp %1=vdp )1(4.14 qcb −= bcc < 65.0
, , , 
, and .  Then , and  when <q .  If buyers believe less than 65 
percent of sellers have vaccinated, absent additional information (about sellers, for instance), buyers will believe it is 
efficient to vaccinate cattle they purchase, regardless of whether sellers have vaccinated their cattle. 
5  Suppose a buyer has parameter values as follows:  5$=c 700$, =e 20$, =s %6=nsp %5=vsp
%2=ndp %1=vdp )1(2.7 qcb −= bcc ≥ 31.0≥
2.7=s 5$=
scc ≤
31.0≥q
, , , 
, and .  Then , and  when q .  If buyers believe more than 
31 percent of sellers have vaccinated, then it will not be efficient for buyers to vaccinate their cattle, other things 
being equal.  However, if these same parameter values existed for a seller, then c .  Since c , the 
 will hold, suggesting it is efficient for sellers to vaccinate.  Thus, for the same cattle and values of 
parameters, sellers would have an incentive to vaccinate, but buyers would not, as long as buyers perceive the 
probability that sellers vaccinated is .  
